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Abstract
This paper extends a rewriting approximations-based theoretical framework in which the security problem
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explain how to semi-decide whether a protocol using cryptographic primitive algebraic properties is unsafe.
This improvement oﬀers us to draw automatically a complete diagnostic of a security protocol with an
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applied for analysing the NSPK-xor protocol and the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol.
Keywords: Security protocol, algebraic properties, automatic approximation. a
a This work is supported by the french project ACI SATIN.
1 Email: yohan.boichut@univ-orleans.fr
2 Email: pcheam@lsv.ens-cachan.fr
3 Email: Olga.Kouchnarenko@lifc.univ-fcomte.fr
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 239 (2009) 57–72
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2009.05.030
1571-0661/© 2009 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are part of systems for which the security problem is in general
undecidable. Approximations and abstractions represent a well-suited alternative
for verifying them in practice. A lot of investigations have been carried out on this
topic [2,13,8,19,21,24,20,23].
An often encountered diﬃculty is about encoding with non-atomic keys. A non-
atomic key is a key established in several steps from several data. This topic comes
close to the handling of operators with algebraic properties. On a strongly typed
model (model in which the structure of a compound key is clearly speciﬁed), most
of the developed methods are able to perform a protocol analysis. Unfortunately a
secure strongly typed model is not a secure model because of type confusing attacks.
That is why our previous contribution [6] has extended the veriﬁcation method
in [5] in order to verify – without typing – security protocols bringing into play
operators with algebraic properties. This improvement has made the computation
of sound over-approximations of the intruder knowledge possible. Consequently, the
safety, i.e., the secrecy preservation on protocols using algebraic properties of the
exclusive or (xor) operator or the exponential (exp) operator can be established
automatically. However, there is a lack of the attack detection, i.e. of showing that
a protocol is unsafe.
This paper extends an expert-human guided approximation technique introduced
in [18] for left-linear term-rewriting systems. We show how this approach may
be extended to a suitable sub-class of non-left-linear term-rewriting systems. The
main contribution of this paper consists of showing the feasibility of the automatic
unsafety veriﬁcation for protocols when 1) the number of sessions is unbounded,
and 2) the cryptographic primitives use algebraic operators properties. We propose
suﬃcient conditions on term rewriting systems (TRSs for short), under which attack
detection on such protocols becomes possible.
To illustrate the contributions, experiments on the detection of attacks against
protocols with the primitives using xor or exp (xored and exped protocols, for short),
are reported. Moreover, to illustrate used notions, many explicit examples have been
introduced.
Structure of the paper The paper is organised as follows. After giving prelim-
inary notions on tree automata and TRSs, we introduce in Section 2 a substitution
depending on rules of a TRS, and a notion of compatibility between such substitu-
tions and ﬁnite tree automata, both suitable for reachability analysis in rewriting
with non left-linear TRSs. In Section 3, we present the extension of [6] dealing
with under-approximations. Finally, before concluding, we give in Section 4 a brief
overview of related works, and we explain how to apply the obtained new results to
analyse xored or exped protocols.
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2 Background and Notation
In this section basic notions on ﬁnite tree automata, term rewriting systems and
approximations are recalled. The reader is referred to [10] for more detail.
2.1 Notation
Given the set N of natural integers, N∗ denotes the ﬁnite strings over N. Let F be a
ﬁnite set of symbols with their arities. The set of symbols of F of arity i is denoted
Fi. Let X be a ﬁnite set whose elements are variables. We assume that X ∩F = ∅.
A ﬁnite ordered tree t over a set of labels (F ,X ) is a function from a preﬁx-closed set
Pos(t) ⊆ N∗ to F ∪ X . A term t over F ∪ X is a labeled tree whose domain Pos(t)
satisﬁes the following properties: Pos(t) is non-empty and preﬁx closed, for each
p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ Fn (with n = 0), then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = {1, . . . , n} and, for
each p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ X or t(p) ∈ F0, then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = ∅. Each element
of Pos(t) is called a position of t. For each subset K of X ∪ F and each term t we
denote by PosK(t) the subset of positions p’s of t such that t(p) ∈ K. Each position
p of t such that t(p) ∈ F , is called a functional position. The set of terms over
(F ,X ) is denoted T (F ,X ). A ground term is a term t such that Pos(t) = PosF (t)
(i.e. such that PosX (t) = ∅). The set of ground terms is denoted T (F). A subterm
t|p of t ∈ T (F ,X ) at position p is deﬁned by: Pos(t|p) = {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} and, For
all j ∈ Pos(t|p), t|p(j) = t(p.j). We denote by t[s]p the term obtained by replacing
in t the subterm t|p by s.
Example 2.1 Let f, g, a ∈ F be functional symbols such that f ∈ F2, g ∈ F1
and a ∈ F0. Let x ∈ X be a variable. Let t be a term of T (F ,X ) such that
t = f(a, g(x)), thus Pos(t) = {, 1, 2, 2.1}, PosF (t) = {, 1, 2}, t(1) = a, t(2) = g,
t() = f , t|1 = a, t|2 = g(x), t|2.1 = x, Pos{x}(t) = {2.1} and t[a]2 = f(a, a).
For all sets A and B, we denote by Σ(A,B) the set of functions from A to B. If
σ ∈ Σ(X , B), then for each term t ∈ T (F ,X ), we denote by tσ the term obtained
from t by replacing for each x ∈ X , the variable x by σ(x). A term rewriting system
R over T (F ,X ) is a ﬁnite set of pairs (l, r) from T (F ,X )×T (F ,X ), denoted l→r,
such that the set of variables occurring in r is included in the set of variables of l. A
TRS is left-linear if for each rule l→r, every variable occurs at most once in l. For
each ground term t, we denote by R(t) the set of ground terms t
′
such that there
exist a rule l → r of R, a function μ ∈ Σ(X ,T (F)) and a position p of t satisfying
t|p = lμ and t
′
= t[rμ]p. The relation {(t, t
′
) | t
′
∈ R(t)} is classically denoted →R.
If t→Rt
′ for t, t′ ∈ T (F), then t is a rewriting predecessor of t′ and t′ is rewriting
successor of t. For each set of ground terms B we denote by R∗(B) the set of ground
terms related to an element of B modulo the reﬂexive-transitive closure of →R.
A tree automaton A is a tuple (Q,Δ, F ), where Q is the set of states, Δ the
set of transitions, and F the set of ﬁnal states. Transitions are rewriting rules of
the form f(q1, . . . , qk)→q, where f ∈ Fk and the qi’s are in Q. A term t ∈ T (F)
is accepted or recognised by A if there exists q ∈ F such that t→∗Δq (we also write
t→∗Aq). The set of terms accepted by A is denoted L(A). For each state q ∈ Q, we
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write L(A, q) for the tree language L((Q,Δ, {q})). A tree automaton is ﬁnite if its
set of transitions is ﬁnite (see Example 2.2).
Example 2.2 Let A = (Q,Δ, F ) be a tree automaton such that F = {f, g, a}
with f ∈ F2, g ∈ F1 and a ∈ F0, Q = {qf , q1}, F = {qf} and Δ =
{f(q1, q1)→qf , a→q1, g(q1)→q1}. Then, L(A, q1) = {g
∗(a)} and L(A, qf ) = L(A) =
{f(g∗(a), g∗(a))}.
In [6], a new kind of substitution has been introduced. We recall this deﬁnition
below. Notice that the domain of these substitutions is not the set of variables
anymore, but a set of positions. Thus, given a variable, this allows a symbolic
representation of its values.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let R be a term rewriting system, Q a set of states and l → r ∈ R.
An (l → r)-substitution is a function from PosX (l) into Q.
We then adapt this kind of substitution to the rewriting framework in the follow-
ing way. Let l→r ∈ R and σ be an (l → r)-substitution. We denote by lσ the term
of T (F ,Q) such that Pos(lσ) = Pos(l), and for each p ∈ Pos(l), if p ∈ PosX (l)
then lσ(p) = σ(p), otherwise lσ(p) = l(p). Similarly, we denote by rσ the term of
T (F ,Q) deﬁned by: Pos(rσ) = Pos(r) and, for each p ∈ Pos(r), if p /∈ PosX (r)
then rσ(p) = r(p) and rσ(p) = σ(p
′
) otherwise, where p
′
= minPosr(p)(l) (positions
are lexicographically ordered). For a given tree automaton, a particular class of
(l → r)-substitutions can be drawn.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let A be a ﬁnite tree automaton. We say that an (l → r)-
substitution σ is A-compatible if for each x ∈ Var(l),
⋂
p∈Pos{x}(l)
L(A, σ(p)) = ∅.
Example 2.5 Let Aexe = ({q0, qf},Δexe, {qf}) with the set of transitions Δexe =
{A→q0, A→qf ,f(qf , q0)→qf , h(q0, q0)→q0}. Let Rexe = {f(x, h(x, y))→h(A,x)}.
The automaton Aexe recognizes the set of trees such that every path from the root
to a leaf is of the form f∗h∗A. Let us consider the substitution σexe deﬁned by
σexe(1) = qf , σexe(2.1) = q0 and σexe(2.2) = q0. The tree t = A can be reduced to qf
and belongs to L(A, σexe(1)). Furthermore t→q0, so t ∈ L(A, σexe(2.1)). Therefore
σexe is A-compatible.
Finally, the last notion we introduce is the deﬁnition of an approximation func-
tion.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let A be a ﬁnite tree automaton. An approximation function (for
A) is a function associating with each tuple (l → r, σ, q), where l → r ∈ R, σ is an
A-compatible (l → r)-substitution and q a state of A, a mapping from Pos(r) to Q.
Example 2.7 Consider the automaton Aexe, the term rewriting system Rexe and
the substitution σexe deﬁned in Example 2.5. For σexe, an approximation function
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γexe may be deﬁned by:
γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(ε) = q1, γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(1) = q0, γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(2) = q1.
To totally deﬁne γexe, the other (ﬁnitely many) Aexe-compatible substitutions should
be considered too.
This notion is very useful for reachability analysis in rewriting with non left-linear
TRSs as shown in the following section.
2.2 Reachability Analysis in Rewriting with non Left-linear TRSs
This section recalls the approximation-based framework we have been developing,
and explains our objectives from a formal point of view.
Given a tree automaton A and a TRS R (for several classes of automata and
TRSs), the tree automata completion [19,18] algorithm computes a tree automaton
Ak such that L(Ak) = R
∗(L(A)) when it is possible (for the classes of TRSs covered
by this algorithm see [18]), and such that L(Ak) ⊇ R
∗(L(A)) otherwise.
The tree automata completion works as follows. From A = A0 completion builds
a sequence A0,A1, . . . ,Ak of automata such that if s ∈ L(Ai) and s→Rt then t ∈
L(Ai+1). If there is a ﬁx-point automaton Ak such that R
∗(L(Ak)) = L(Ak), then
one has L(Ak) = R
∗(L(A0)) (or L(Ak) ⊇ R
∗(L(A)) if R is not in one class of [18]).
In particular, for non left-linear TRSs, the completion is not sound. Indeed, if the
completion converges towards a ﬁx-point automaton Ak, L(Ak) is not necessarily
either R∗(L(A)) or a super set of R∗(L(A)).
In [6], the completion procedure has been improved so that the method is sound
for non left-linear TRSs. This technique is introduced below. As mentioned previ-
ously, the completion builds a sequence A0,A1, . . . ,Ak of tree automata such that
the set of terms reachable in one step of rewriting from L(Ai) are in L(Ai+1). To
build Ai+1 from Ai, we achieve a completion step which consists of ﬁnding critical
pairs between →R and →Ai . Formally, for an approximation function γ, a rule
l→r ∈ R and an Ai-compatible (l → r)-substitution σ, a critical pair is an instance
lσ of l such that there exists q ∈ Q satisfying lσ→∗Aiq and rσ  →
∗
Ai
q. For every
critical pair, such that lσ→∗Aiq and rσ  →
∗
Ai
q, detected between R and Ai, Ai+1 is
built by adding new transitions to Ai, so that it recognizes rσ in q, i.e. rσ→Ai+1q.
Before giving a deﬁnition of a completion step (Def. 2.9), we introduce a normalisa-
tion step described in Deﬁnition 2.8. Note that the transition rσ→q is not necessarily
a transition of the form f(q1, . . . , qn)→q
′ and so has to be normalized ﬁrst. For ex-
ample, to normalize a transition of the form f(g(a), h(q′))→q, we need to ﬁnd some
states q1, q2, q3 and replace the previous transition by a set of normalized transitions:
{a→q1, g(q1)→q2, h(q
′)→q3, f(q2, q3)→q}. The states used in a normalization step
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do not grow on trees and it is of the approximation function γ concern to deliver
them at each completion step. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.8 Let A = (Q0,Δ, F0) be a ﬁnite tree automaton, γ be an approxima-
tion function for A, l → r be a rule of R, σ be an A-compatible (l → r)-substitution,
and q be a state of A. We denote by Normγ(l → r, σ, q) the following set of transi-
tions, called normalization of (l → r, σ, q):
{f(q1, . . . , qk)→q
′
|p ∈ PosF (r), r(p) = f,
q
′
= q if p = ε otherwise q
′
= γ(l → r, σ, q)(p)
qi = γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.i) if p.i /∈ PosX (r),
qi = σ(min{p
′
∈ PosX (l) | l(p
′
) = r(p.i)})otherwise}
The min is computed for the lexical order.
Notice that the set {p
′
∈ PosX (l) | l(p
′
) = r(p.i)} used in the above deﬁnition
is not empty. Indeed, in a TRS, variables occurring in the right-hand side must, by
deﬁnition, occur in the left-hand side too.
Deﬁnition 2.9 Let R be a TRS. Let A0 = (Q0,Δ0, F0) be a ﬁnite tree automaton
and γ an approximation function for A0. The automaton Cγ(A0) = (Q1,Δ1, F1) is
deﬁned by:
Δ1 = Δ0 ∪
⋃
Normγ(l → r, σ, q)
where the union involves all rules l → r ∈ R, all states q ∈ Q0, all A0-compatible
(l → r)-substitutions σ such that lσ→∗A0q and rσ  →
∗
A0
q, F1 = F0 and Q1 =
Q0 ∪ Q2, where Q2 denotes the set of states occurring in left/right-hand sides of
transitions of Δ1.
See Example 2.10 for an example of a completion step.
Example 2.10 [A completion step] Following Example 2.7, ε and 1 are the func-
tional positions of r = h(A, y). We set q
′
of the deﬁnition to be equal to qf . Thus
Normγexe(l → r, σexe, qf ) is of the form {A→q?, h(q?, q??)→qf}. Since for r, the
position 1 is a functional position and 2 is in PosX (r), we use the last line of the
deﬁnition to compute q?? and q? is deﬁned by the approximation function γexe.
Finally we obtain:
Normγexe(l → r, σexe, qf ) = {r(1)→γexe(1), r(ε)(γexe(1), σexe(1))→qf}
= {A→q0, h(q0, qf )→qf}.
Consequently, the tree automaton resulting from a completion step on Aexe with
γexe and Rexe is Cγ(Aexe) = ({q0, qf},Δexe ∪ {A→q0, h(q0, qf )→qf}, {qf}).
Notice that a new completion step could be performed on Cγ(Aexe). However, no
transition would be added since no new critical pair would be detected. So, Cγ(Aexe)
is the ﬁx-point automaton. According to Theorem 2.11, every term reachable by
rewriting from L(Aexe) are in the language of the ﬁx-point automaton.
Following theorem was proved in [6].
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Theorem 2.11 Let (An) and (γn) be respectively a sequence of ﬁnite tree automata
and a sequence of approximation functions such that for each integer n, γn is an
approximation function for An and An+1 = Cγn(An). If there exists a positive integer
N , such that for every n ≥ N , An = AN , then R
∗(L(A0)) ⊆ L(AN ).
From a veriﬁcation point of view, this technique is very helpful. Indeed, for a
system Σ whose transition relation is Δ, one speciﬁes the initial conﬁguration of Σ by
a tree language E, and Δ by a TRS R. With a well-suited approximation function
γ, an over-approximation of reachable conﬁgurations of Σ, denoted EγR, can be
computed. Finally, a set of bad conﬁgurations, denoted EBad, can be encoded with
a tree language and if EγR ∩ EBad is empty, then no bad conﬁguration is reachable.
In particular, in [6], we have used this technique for verifying security protocols
bringing into play the xor operator (⊕). Note that the nilpotence property of ⊕ is
speciﬁed with a non left-linear rule, i.e., x ⊕ x→0. The tree languages specify the
intruder knowledge and the conﬁgurations of the network. The TRS speciﬁes the
protocol and the intruder abilities for decoding, coding, depairing messages. Thus,
if a secret term t does not belong to an over-approximation of the knowledge that
the intruder might have, then t is actually secret.
3 Under-Approximations for non Left-linear TRSs
The over-approximation results in [6] do not provide a way to prove that a particular
term is reachable: the method is not complete. This section adapts the means and
extends the results in [6] to under-approximations computations. In the security
protocol framework, computing under-approximations allows an under-estimation of
the intruder knowledge, and thus secrecy ﬂaws detection. Indeed, if a secret datum
is in the intruder knowledge under-estimation, then the intruder actually knows this
secret. The main idea (and problem) behind the under-approximations is that one
wants the languages of computed tree automata to be in the set of terms reachable
by rewriting . Having some conditions on the TRS makes it possible to control the
completion, and proving that a term is actually reachable is then possible.
We deﬁne here γ to be an injective approximation function from R × (N∗ →
Q)×N∗×Q into Q. Theorem 3.2 shows that with such an approximation function,
an under-approximation of the set of reachable terms is possible. Before, Lemma
3.1 presents an intermediary result useful for proving Theorem 3.2: this result re-
veals some features of terms recognised by Cγ(A) for which there exists a rewriting
predecessor recognised by A. In the following, we introduce the notation NLV (t)
which for a term t of T (F ,X ), denotes the set of non-linear variables of t, i.e., the
set of variables occurring at least twice within t.
Lemma 3.1 Let R be a right-linear TRS for which NLV (l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅ for all
l→r ∈ R. Let A be the current tree automaton and Cγ(A) be the tree automaton
obtained after one completion step with R and γ. If there exist a ground term t over
F , a state q of A and a function τ from Pos(t) to Q such that t ∈ L(Cγ(A), q), t ∈
L(A, q) and τ satisﬁes the following conditions: (i) τ(ε) = q; (ii) for all p ∈ Pos(t),
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t|p ∈ L(Cγ(A), τ(p)) and, (iii) for all p ∈ Pos(t) \ {ε}, if τ(p) is a state of A, then
t|p ∈ L(A, τ(p)). Then there exists t0 ∈ T (F) such that t0 ∈ L(A, q) and t0→Rt.
Proof To simplify the notation we denote by Δ1 the set of transitions of the au-
tomaton Cγ(A), Δ0 the set of transitions of A and Q0 the set of states of A.
The proof consists of 1) the construction of a term s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that
t→∗Δ1s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q, (1)
2) the construction, by iterating a backward process, of a term s ∈ T (F ,Q) such
that
t→∗Δ1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q, and (2)
3) the proof that
t→∗Δ0rσ→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q. (3)
First, using (ii) at the position ε gives
t|ε→
∗
Δ1τ(ε).
Since t = t|ε and since τ(ε) = q (by (i)), one has
t→∗Δ1q.
Since t ∈ T (F) one has t = q, and every derivation t→∗Δ1q has the length one,
at least. Consequently, there exists s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that
t→∗Δ1s1→Δ1q.
We now show by contradiction that the transition s1→q /∈ Δ0. Suppose that
s1→q is a transition of Δ0. Then s1 ∈ T (F ,Q0). Thus, using (iii), t→
∗
Δ0
s1→Δ0q,
a contradiction ( t  →∗Δ0q).
Therefore, the transition s1→q is in Δ1 \ Δ0. By deﬁnition of Δ1 (see Deﬁni-
tion 2.9), there exist q
′
, σ : PosX(l)
∗ → Q and l→r ∈ R such that s1→Cγ(A)q ∈
Normγ(l→r, σ, q
′
) and
lσ→∗Δ0q
′
. (4)
Now by deﬁnitions of Normγ(l→r, σ, q
′
) and γ, each source state or target state of
a transition in Normγ(l→r, σ, q
′
) is either Q\Q0, or is equal to q
′
. Since s1→Cγ(A)q ∈
Normγ(l→r, σ, q
′
), either q ∈ Q\Q0, or q = q
′
. Because q ∈ Q0, one has q = q
′
and
t→∗Δ1s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q.
We are done for (1). We now perform an iterative construction. If s1 /∈ T (F ,Q0),
then there exists a position p of s1 such that s1(p) ∈ Q \ Q0. Thus s1(p) is of the
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form s1(p) = γ(l→r, σ, q)(p). Since γ is injective, the only transition of Δ1 leading
to s1(p) is
r(p)(γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.))→s1(p).
Consequently, the derivation t→∗Δ1s1 has to conclude by
t→∗Δ1s2→s1
where
s2 = s1[r(p)(γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.))]p.
So, one has
t→∗Δ1s2→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q.
Now, if s2 /∈ T (F ,Q0), the same construction can be iteratively applied to s2 and
so on. Consequently, one can build a term s ∈ T (F,Q0) such that Pos(s) = Pos(r)
and
t→∗Δ1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q, (5)
and for each position p of s such that s(p) /∈ Q,
s(p) = r(p). (6)
We are done for (2).
We can begin the last part of the proof. Let q1, . . . , qn be the states occurring in
s by reading s from the left to the right. Let p1, . . . , pn be respectively the positions
in s of states q1, . . . , qn. Notice that the backward construction of s is deterministic.
Indeed every derivation from t to q can be split up to
t→∗Δ1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q.
It implies that for each qi, with i = 1, . . . , n, one has
qi = τ(pi). (7)
At this stage, s is of the form rσ since γ is deﬁned for every position of r.
Now using (7) and the hypothesis iii), one has
t→Δ0rσ→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q.
The TRS R being right-linear with NLV (l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅ for each rule l→r of
R, one can built a substitution μ : PosX (l) → T (F) such that:
• For p ∈ PosVar(r)(l), one can set μ(p) = t
′ and t′ = t|p′ with p
′ ∈ Pos{l|p}(r).
Moreover, since l|p /∈ NLV (l), one obtains μ(p) = t
′→∗Δ0σ(p).
• For p ∈ PosVar(l)\Var(r)(l), one can proceed in the following way:
· if l(p) ∈ NLV (l) then one can set μ(p′1), . . . , μ(p
′
1) to t
′ where t′ ∈ L(A0, σ(p
′
1))∩
... ∩ L(A0, σ(p
′
n)) with {p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n} = Pos{l(p)}(l).
· Otherwise, one can set μ(p) to a term t′ ∈ L(A0, σ(p)).
By this way, there exists t0 = lμ ∈ T (F) such that t0→
∗
A0
q and t0→Rt, proving
the lemma. 
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The following result shows that each term of the language Cγ(A0) is reachable
by rewriting from A0 and using R.
Theorem 3.2 Let A0 = (Q0,Δ0, F0) be a ﬁnite tree automaton. Let R be a right-
linear TRS. Given the approximation function γ deﬁned at the beginning of Section
3, if for all l→r ∈ R, Var(r) ∩NLV (l) = ∅ then L(Cγ(A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)).
Proof Let Pn be the following proposition:
For all t ∈ L(Cγ(A0)), if there exists a function τ from Pos(t) to Q such that
τ(ε) = qf and for all p ∈ Pos(t),
t|p→
∗
Cγ(A0)
τ(p) and t[τ(p)]p→
∗
Cγ(A0)
qf
and such that
|{p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 ∧ t|p  →
∗
A0τ(p)}| = n,
then t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).
We prove that Pn is true for all n ≥ 0 by induction on n. To simplify notations,
let
NR(t, τ) = {p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 and t|p  →
∗
A0τ(p)}.
[P0 :] Assume that t and τ satisfy the hypothesis on P0. We have |NR(t, τ)| = 0.
In particular, ε ∈ NR(t, τ). So, t = t|ε→A0τ(ε) = qf . Since A0 and Cγ(A0) have
the same set of ﬁnal states, t ∈ L(A0).
[Pn =⇒ Pn+1:] Assume that Pn is true for n ≥ 0 and that t and τ satisfy the
hypothesis on Pn+1. Since NR(t, τ) is non-empty, let p be a maximal element
of NR(t, τ) (for the lexicographical order). Then, by maximality of p, one can
apply Lemma 3.1 to t|p. Thus, there exists t0 ∈ T (F) such that t0→
∗
A0
τ(p) and
t0→Rtp. Therefore, there exists a function τ1 from Pos(t0) into Q0 such that
for all p
′
, t0→
∗
A0
τ1(p
′
), t[τ1(p
′
)]p′→
∗
Cγ(A0)
τ(p). We deﬁne the function τ2 from
Pos(t[t0]p) to Q as follows.
· If p is not a preﬁx of p
′
, then τ2(p
′
) = τ(p
′
),
· Otherwise, if p
′
is of the form p.u, then τ2(p
′
) = τ1(u).
By construction, t[t0]p→Rt and |NR(t[t0]p, τ2)| = n − 1. Thus, by induction,
t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).

Let C
(n)
γ (A0) be the tree automaton obtained after n completion steps performed
from A0 by using the TRSR and the approximation function γ. Finally, Proposition
3.3 shows that the approximation function γ provides a sound under-approximation
of reachable terms.
Proposition 3.3 If R is right-linear and for all l→r ∈ R, NLV (l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅
then for all n ≤ 0, L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)), L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)) and⋃
n≥0L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) = R
∗(L(A0)).
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Proof By deﬁnition C
(n+1)
γ (A0) = gγ(C
(n)
γ (A0))). Consequently, the set of transi-
tions of C
(n)
γ (A0) is included in the transitions set of C
(n+1)
γ (A0). Thus L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆
L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
Now, using a Lemma 2 of [6] leading to Theorem 2.11, one has for all n ≥ 1,
R(L(C(n)γ (A0))) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
Consequently, by a direct induction,
R≤n(L(A0)) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
It implies that
R∗(L(A0)) ⊆
⋃
n≥0
L(C(n)γ (A0)).
One can prove that for all n ∈ N, L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)) by a direct induction
on n using Theorem 3.2, and we are done. 
At this point, we have developed theoretical frameworks which lead either to
over-approximations of the set of reachable terms in general, or to its under-
approximations under additional conditions on TRSs. The obtained results allow
us to apply the approximation-based methods to system veriﬁcation as presented in
the next section.
4 Experiments and Related Works
With the extension brought for the under-approximations computation, we are now
able to detect whether a protocol using algebraic properties of cryptographic prim-
itives is ﬂawed or not. Actually, while the protocol is ﬂawed in the rewriting model
for any number of sessions, in general, it turns out to be a real attack against the
protocol when an attack concerns a long term secret between two honnest agents.
We consider a long term secret to be a secret which is never revealed, even in fu-
ture sessions. In this section, we present some experimental results obtained on
two protocols, well-known to be ﬂawed, which are NSPK-xor and the key establish-
ment à la Diﬃe-Helmann protocol. The technique presented in this paper has been
implemented in the tool TA4SP.
4.1 TA4SP for Attack Detection
This section details two protocols, well-known to be ﬂawed, which are NSPK-xor
and the key establishment à la Diﬃe-Helmann protocol in its simplest form. The
notations used are the following: X -> Y: Z speciﬁes that X sends the message Z to
Y, X.Y is the concatenation of data X and Y, and {X}Y (or {X}_Y) is the encoding of
the message X by the message Y. Moreover, data Na, Nb, ni(Na) and ni(Nb) with i
being an integer, are fresh random numbers, also called a nonces. Finally, the last
concept to know concerns the keys, which can be public, private or symmetric. To
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a public key Pka is associated a private key Prka. A message encoded by one can
be decoded by the other: {{M}Pka}Prka = {{M}Prka}Pka = M. A symmetric key K can
decode a message encoded by itself: {{M}K}K = M.
The NSPK-xor Protocol is composed of three steps so that each participant
can authenticate the other. First, the agent A sends the message {Na.A}KB to the
agent B. Second, B sends {Nb.Na ⊕ B}KA to A. Finally, A sends {Nb}KB to B
as a conﬁrmation. Using TA4SP, we obtain in 71.03 seconds that the protocol does
not preserve the secrecy of the data Nb against an intruder. Thanks to the AVISPA
toolset, one can use one of three other tools (in this case CL-AtSe [25]) for exhibiting
the following attack trace.
1. i -> (a,6): start
2. (a,6) -> i: {n9(Na).a}_ki
3. i -> (a,3): start
4. (a,3) -> i: {n1(Na).a}_kb
5. i -> (b,4): {xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na))).a}_kb
6. (b,4) -> i: {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka
7. i -> (a,6): {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka
8. (a,6) -> i: {n5(Nb)}_ki
At steps 1. and 2. of the attack, the agent a initiates a session with the intruder
by sending the message {n9(Na).a}_ki to the intruder where n9(Na) is a nonce
generated by a and ki is the public key of the intruder. At steps 3. and 4., the
agent a initiates a session with the agent b. The intruder composes at step 5.
the message xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na))).a and sends it to b after having encoded it
with the public key of the agent b. The agent b deduces at step 6. that this
message comes from the agent a thanks to the identity occurring in the received
message. Moreover, b considers the message xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na)))’ as the nonce
generated by a. Consequently, b performs the second step of the protocol. At step
6. of the attack trace, b composes n5(Nb).xor(b,xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na)))) which
is equivalent to n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na)) after considering the algebraic properties of
⊕ (xor operator). Then, he sends it to a after having encoded it with the public
key of a. The agent b declares also the nonce n5(Nb) as a secret shared between
himself and the agent a. But, according to the point of view of the agent a, the
message {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka should come from i (the intruder) because
n5(Nb) identiﬁes the agent i for a. According to his deduction, the agent a sends
{n5(Nb)}_ki to the intruder. Finally, the latter can deduce n5(Nb) which is a secret
supposed to be shared between b and a.
The Diﬃe-Helmann Protocol is a key establishment protocol between two
agents A and B. The simplest version of this protocol is composed of three steps.
At step 1, A generates the nonce Na and computes exp(G,Na) (standing for GNa)
where G is a number known by every agents. Thus A sends the message exp(G,Na)
to the agent B. At step 2, the agent B generates also a number Nb and computes
on the one hand exp(G,Nb) and on the other hand K = exp(X,Nb) where X is
the message received i.e. exp(G,Na). The former is sent to A and the latter stands
for the symmetric key shared between A and B. As soon as B receives the message
Y. Boichut et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 239 (2009) 57–7268
exp(G,Nb) from A, (s)he then computes exp(exp(G,Nb), Na) and thus considers it
as the symmetric key shared with A. Indeed, according to the algebraic properties
of the exponentiation, K = exp(exp(G,Na), Nb) = exp(exp(G,Nb), Na). Finally,
the message {secret}K is sent by A to B in which secret is a datum initially known
uniquely by A and B. Using TA4SP this protocol has been shown as being ﬂawed in
24.73 seconds. For this protocol, a MIM (Man in the Middle) attack is known and
is detailed below with the attack trace outputted with the AVISPA tool-set.
1. i -> (a,3): start
2. (a,3) -> i: exp(g,n1(Na))
3. i -> (b,4): g
4. (b,4) -> i: exp(g,n5(Nb))
5. i -> (a,3): g
6. (a,3) -> i: {secab}_(exp(g,n1(Na)))
7. i -> (b,4): {secab}_(exp(g,n5(Nb)))
8. (b,4) -> i: ()
Roughly, the intruder establishes two keys: exp(exp(g,n1(Na)),g) with a at
steps 2 and 5 and exp(exp(g,n5(Nb)),g) with b at steps 3 and 4. At step 6,
the agent a sends the secret data to b with the key unfortunately shared with the
intruder. The intruder then extracts the secret data and forwards it to b with the
other key. Finally, b is persuaded that this message comes from a.
4.2 Related Work
In [12], the authors study the IBM 4758 CCA (Common Cryptographic Architecture)
API which has been shown as ﬂawed in [7]. In response to this ﬂaw, IBM then
has proposed three recommendations designed to prevent it. The formalisation of
these recommendations leads Cortier et al. to draw up a particular class of security
protocols using the operator ⊕ for which the secrecy problem is decidable with an
unbounded number of sessions. They have then shown that any one of the three
recommendations is suﬃcient to secure the API against a Dolev-Yao intruder [16].
In the recent survey [11], the authors give an overview of the existing methods
in formal approaches to analyse cryptographic protocols. In the same work, a list
of some relevant algebraic properties of cryptographic operators is established, and
for each of them, the authors provide examples of protocols or attacks using these
properties. This survey lists two drawbacks with the recent results aiming at the
analysis of protocols with algebraic properties. First, in most of the papers a partic-
ular decision procedure is proposed for a particular property. Second, the authors
emphasise the fact that the results remain theoretical, and very few implementations
automatically verify protocols with algebraic properties.
In [22] it has been shown that using equational tree automata under associativity
and/or commutativity is relevant for security problems of cryptographic protocols
with an equational property. For protocols modeled by associative-commutative
TRSs, the authors announce the possibility for the analysis to be done automatically
thanks to the tool ACTAS manipulating associative-commutative tree automata and
using approximation algorithms. However, the engine has still room to be modiﬁed
and optimised to support an automated veriﬁcation.
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The Proverif tool [2] allows an unbounded number of sessions but – like in our
models – abstractions are performed on fresh data and thus false attacks can be de-
tected. Moreover, in [3], the authors note that their technique does have limitations,
and in particular, it does not apply to some equational theories.
The recent Scyther tool [14] can verify protocols with an unbounded number of
sessions and nonces. It can handle veriﬁcation of complex authentication properties,
handle non-atomic keys, and generate correct attacks. A performance comparison
between Scyther and a number of other tools has been detailed in [15]. Notice that
[15] reports on a set of protocols that excludes protocols using algebraic properties.
One of the new features of the Maude-NPA tool is that it allows to equation-
ally reason about security when facing attempted attacks on low-level algebraic
properties of the functions used in a protocol such as, for example, associativity-
commutativity, Boolean theory, and some forms of modular exponentiation [17].
The Maude-NPA tool follows an approach similar to that of OFMC since the au-
thors consider depth parameters for uniﬁcation problems in some equational theories.
However, the Maude-NPA tool needs the help of expert users.
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the symbolic approximation-based
approach we have been developing is well-adapted for detecting attacks on protocols
using algebraic properties while considering an unbounded number of sessions. In-
deed, the automatically generated symbolic under-approximation function enables
us 1) an automated normalisation of transitions, and 2) an automated completion
procedure within the set of reachable terms.
With this extension our approximation-based framework proposes veriﬁcation
methods using either over-approximations of the set of reachable terms in general,
or its under-approximations under additional conditions on TRSs. The contributions
of the paper have been integrated into the push-button tool TA4SP [1] successfully
applied for analysing the NSPK-xor protocol and the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol. Let
us remark that TA4SP is used for protocols speciﬁed in the standard High Level
Protocol Speciﬁcation Language (HLPSL) [9]. This language is known to be suitable
for industrial users.
Future development concerns implementation optimisation. We intend to in-
vestigate further algebraic properties that can be handled in practice. In this di-
rection, we project to develop a theoretical framework in order to compute under-
approximations without the right-linearity condition required Theorem 3.2. A so-
lution could be close to the one we have proposed in [4] in order to relax the left-
linearity condition for a signiﬁcant class of TRSs.
This may for example provide an approximation-based approach for detecting
attacks on security protocols with cryptographic primitives using the homomorphism
property [11].
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